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A firm needs assets to make sales. Assets must be financed by
equities and liabilities. As the firm grows, it should ensure an
adequate future flow of funds on one hand and should minimize cost
of the capital on the other. Therefore, long-term financing
decision-making is a very complex process, but has great impact on
the well-being of the firm. This is particularly true for Hong Kong
Telephone and China Light Power, the two largest local public
utility companies, which have hundreds of millions of dollars worth
of annual capital expenditure.
The writers have carried out detailed analysis of the annual
reports of these utilities and have conducted in-depth interviews
with the financial managers of these two companies on their
long-term financing policy and practice. It is clear that operating
profit is the main source of funds. Export credit, which provides
favourable terms for purchasing foreign equipment, is the mo s t
consistently used external source of capital.
Telephone confronted a liquidity problem in 1973 and 1974. It
was brought about partly by the slackness of management in the
planning of long-term financing to sustain the Company's rapid
growth. After the Scheme of Control was set up in 1976, the revenues
and profits have been growing rapidly. Despite the favourable
financial performance, it is found that there is a lack of
well-defined optimal capital structure and corporate debt capacity.
2China Light Power significantly increased its long-term
borrowing after 1979. The limit of the Company's debt capacity is
defined by its debt-equity ratio. For the Company al one, i. e.
excluding its associated companies, the prevailing level of debt is
not high.
The leverage of Hong Kong Telephone is much lower than that of
China Light. It is recommended that both companies make more
extensive use of export credit financing because of its low cost.
Also, it seems that the management of the two companies should
develop more sophisticated decision rules for the selection of
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8PREFACE
Hong Kong Telephone and China Light Power have been
undertaking many capital-intensive investments in plants and
equipment. Therefore adequate long-term financing is no doubt an
integral part in the fulfilment of their commitments.
Despite the importance of this subject, there has been no
comprehensive study done in related fields in Hong Kong, not to
mention research on the same title. The objective of this report is
to adopt an objective and critical appraisal of the long-term
financing policy and practice of Telephone and China Light.
Evaluation is based on information collected from annual reports and
in-depth interviews with senior financial executives of these two
companies. Recommendations are given based on the analyses.
The contents of this research are divided into four parts:
Part I --Chapter I gives an introduction to the subject
whereas Chapter II describes the methodology and
structure of the research.
Part II--This part is the heart of the study. There are
analyses on the primary and secondary information
obtained from the research. It is followed by problem
identification and evaluation. Chapter III and IV
cover the study on Hong Kong Telephone whereas
Chapter V and VI are taken up by China Light Power.
9Part III-Chapter VII is a comparative study among Telephone,
China Light Power and three other public utility
companies on long-term financing practice. The aim is
to give additional coherency and information in the
report.
Part IV--Chapter VIII concludes the study by giving a summary
of the results and recommendations. A highlight of
the future of Hong Kong Telephone and China Light
Power in long-term financing is also put forward
at the end of the report.
This report is the product of many people. The writers are most
grateful to Professor John L. Espy for his continuous encouragement,
advices and guidance. Likewise, we would like to thank Mr. Wilson
Kwan of Hong Kong Telephone and Mr. Norman Broadhurst of China Light
Power who are generous enough to give valuable information for our
study. Special thanks are due to Mr. Paul Ng who helped us to
arrange the interview with China Light Power.
We also would like to thank Mrs. Scott who gave very useful
comments on our use of English and style of writing in this report.
Finally, we wish to thank faculty members and our fellow





A business entity, may it be an entrepreneur, a partnership or
corporation, needs assets to make sales. Assets have to be financed
by liabilities and equities. This gives rise to one of the most
important operations of financial management- financing
decision-making. The effective management of liabilities is every
bit as vital to the financial well-being of the firm as is the
1
management of assets. Research by Scott has emphasised the critical
relationship of financing policy to the firm's ultimate valuation by
the market.
Short-Term Financing
By the conventional accounting practice, a firm's financing is
categorized into short-term and long-term, with one year of maturity
as the dividing line. Short-term financing consists of the current
liabilities, which are usually accounts payable, accrued expenses,
deferred revenue, provision for profits tax, and debts scheduled for
repayment within one year. All these directly affect the Company's
liquidity position, cash flow adequacy, and the fulfilment of
1David F. Scott. Evidence on the Importance of Financial
Structure. Financial Management (Summer 1972), pp.45-50.
2
day-to-day obligations as well as its operating profit. Although
short-term financing is not the main subject of this study, it has
great implication on the financial position of a firm and hence
affects long- term financing decisions in certain ways. Therefore,
some analysis in this aspect is integrated into the content of this
report.
Long-Term Financing
Long-term financing has an even more critical significance and
implication. When a firm increases its size and engages in large
scale projects that take years or even decades to complete, it must
ensure an adequate future flow of funds to meet its commitment. On
the other hand, it should always minimize the cost of capital and
maintain the optimal capital sturcture. Therefore, long-term
financing decisions are central problems for financial managers.
Sources of long-term financing can be internal or external. One
internal source is that generated by operations (mainly net income
with adjustment for depreciation). Conservative and risk-avoiding
management inclines to rely solely on internal financing. But due to
the limited amount of such financing, the growth of the firm tends
to be restricted and slow. Therefore, many firms, especially large
corporations, ususlly obtain funds from the capital market. External
sources of funds consist of debt and equity. The former is the
borrowing from financial institutions, whereas the latter is the
issuing of stocks.
When time comes that the firm needs long-term financing, the
3
financial manager has an interlocking network of decisions to make-
an internal or external source of funds? If external then debt or
equity? If debt then by which instrument? Through which institution?
And with what respective costs and impacts on capital structure?
These are just some of the pertinent questions that require
sophisticated planning and analysis. Mis-guided financing decisions
may seriously undermine the financial strength of the firm and may
even drag it towards bankruptcy.
Objectives and Justification for the Study
Given the significance and yet complex nature of long-term
financing decisions in a firm, we think it is interesting and
worthwhile to conduct an empirical research in this field. We would
like to study what are the long-term financing practices and
policies in large business corporations in the past decade. The
organizations selected are two public utility companies- Hong Kong
Telephone Company, Limited and China Light Power Company, Limited.
Public utilities in general, and these two companies in particular,
have been undertaking many capital-intensive investments in plants
and equipment. A purchase of hundreds of millions worth of fixed
1
assets is the norm rather than the exception for Hong Kong Telephone
and China Light. Moreover, the companies have to be actively
1
Hong Kong Telephone forecasted a capital expenditure of HK
$5,500 million from 1982 to 1988 in its 1981 annual report. China
China Light forecasted a capital expenditure of HK $25,000 million
from 1984 to 1990 in its 1983 annual report.
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engaged in long-term planning of expansion to meet the ever
increasing demand for service. Therefore, adequate long-term
financing is no doubt an integral part in the fulfilment of their
commitments.
Although looking forward can better prepare a corporation for
challenge tomorrow, reviewing the past is equally beneficial because
lessons can be learned from mistakes and weaknesses in traditional
practices that may be still preserved today. This research strives
to adopt an objective and critical appraisal. We hope that it will
draw the attention of management in these two companies, as well as
those in other organizations, to some issues in long-term financing
that they may have neglected in the past.
Lastly, there has been no comprehensive study done in related
fields in Hong Kong, not to mention research on the same title.
Therefore, we hope that this study will stimulate the interest of
others to continue exploring this dynamic subject.
5CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Basically, the research consists of two phases. The first phase
is the study of the companies' annual reports with supplementary
references, such as the prospectus for stock issues, articles in
magazines and news in the press. The data and information will then
be systemically analysed to reveal the pattern of practices and
policies of long-term financing. The observations and results of the
analysis will then be discussed with the staff of the companies in
personal interviews, which is the second phase of the project.
Annual Report Analysis
The annual reports of each company from 1971 to 1982 were
studied. Particular attention was focused on Chairman's Review
and the three financial statements, namely Profit and Loss Account,
Balance Sheet and Statement of Changes in Financial Position.
1
Martin and Scott proposed seven general financial condition
areas that firms might reasonably be expected to consider in
formulating debt-equity decisions- leverage, liquidity,
profitability, dividends, market price, asset size, and sales growth
1John D. Martin and David F. Scott. A Discriminant Analysis of
the Corporate Debt-Equity Decision. Financial Management
(winter 1974), pp.71-79.
6and variability. These dimensions form the framework of our
quantitative analysis. We also found it useful to supplement the
list with information on the composition of the net worth and the
flow of funds. The ratios and statistics chosen as reflective of
these financial areas are operationally defined in Table 2.1. The
data were then collected and arranged in a time-series manner. The
behaviour of different factors over time and their possible
inter-relationships are examined.
Interviews
Structured interviews were conducted with senior financial
staff of the two companies. Each interview was divided into two
parts: (I) annual report review and (II) financing policies and
1
decision-making. Part I is the discussion of our findings on their
respective annual reports and with a special set of questions for
each company. We asked the financial executive about the sources,
nature, pros and cons of various long-term financing instruments,
such as export credits, stocks, warrants and loans that the
companies have been using. Discussion was then focused on the level
of leverage, the purpose of bonus issue, the timing of rights issues
and the use of short-term vs long-term debts. Questions were also
1
Please see Appendix I and II
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raised on some other observations that we have made in the annual
report analysis.
1
In part II of the interview, the same set of questions were
used for both companies. The objective of this section is to gain
some insight into the philosophy that is adopted by the companies in
their long-term financing policy. The financial executives were
asked what factors they would consider in choosing between debt and
equity and what analysis would be used to aid the decision-making
process. Then questions were raised that led into the discussion of
financial leverage measurement, target financial structure, cost of
capital, corporate debt capacity as well as the personnel and
parties involved in the decisions. Lastly, in order to indicate the
implication of long-term financing, we asked if there is a
relationship of financing policy to the firm's ultimate valuation by
the market, or equivalently, whether the use of debt could affect
the market price of the company's stock.
1.
Please see Appendix III
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TABLE 2.1
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF RATIOS STATISTICS
1
Long-term debts
They include deferred creditors and loans but exclude other
deferred liabilities such as deferred taxation, retirement
scheme and consumer deposits.
Leverage
(1) Book values of long-term debts
(2) Ratio of long-term debt to net worth
(long-term debt/ net worth)
(3) Ratio of total debt to net worth
(current liabilities+ long-term debt/ net worth)
Liquidity
(1) Current ratio
(current assets/ current liabilities)
(2) Quick ratio
(current assets-inventories/ current liabilities)
Profitability
Since the profit margins are guaranteed, this area would have
little implication on decision-making.
Divident policy
Payout ratio (dividends per share/ earnings per share)
Market price of common stock
P/E ratio (price per share/ earnings per share)
Asset size and turnover
(1) Book values of net fixed assets
(2) Fixed assets turnover
(Ratio of sales to book values of net fixed assets)
1
For a more detail discussion on long-term debts, please see
the section on debt financing in Chapter III.
9
Sales growth and variability
(1) Sales turnover
(2) Compound grwoth rate of sales
Net worth
It is equivalent to Shareholders' Funds which consist of paid-up
capital and reserves.
Flow of funds
(1) Major components of source and application of funds:
a) total funds generated
b) funds generated from operations
c) issue of shares
d) net change in bank loans export credits
e) purchase of fixed assets
f) total application of funds
g) net change in working capital
(2) Percentage of funds from operations




HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED- PART I:
SOURCE AND APPLICATION OF FUNDS
This chapter begins with a brief introduction of Hong Kong
Telephone's demand for funds. This is then followed by the
description of the various long-term financing instruments the
company has been using over the years under study. The discussion
includes the respective characteristics, merits and drawbacks of
these instruments. The next chapter will probe into the policy of
the Company in using these financing instruments.
Application of Funds
Capital Expenditure
The growth of sales revenues for Telephone has been very rapid
for the past decade. The compound growth rate of sales from 1971 to
1982 is calculated to be 12.8 percent. As the sales of a firm are
increased, assets must also be expanded. This is particularly true
for Telephone because the communication business is
technology-intensive and demands sophisticated expensive equipment
and facilities. Therefore, the amount of net fixed assets increases
L
Please see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1
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with sales, but presumably at a different rate because there is a
lead time from investment to installation. The magnitude of the
annual purchase of fixed assets can be appreciated from Table 3.2.
The expenditure increased from about $250 million in 1975 to $400
million in 1980 and further to $700 million in 1982. Besides the
large cost that is capitalized each year, the company is actively
engaged in long-term investment planning (five-year forecast), which
inevitably involves corresponding financing decisions. As at the end
of 1982, it was forecasted that the capital expenditure for the next
1
six years is about $5 billion.
Dividends
From Table 3.2, it can be concluded that the company keeps
dividends at a relatively steady dollar amount per share ($1.5 from
1977 to 1980 and $1.55 in 1981 and 1982), with the exception of 1974
in which no dividends were paid due to a liquidity problem. From
1971 to 1982, the payout ratio fluctuates from 40 percent to 56
percent. The stable dividend policy and high payout, which are
characteristics of public utilities, tend to attract those investors
who desire a steady stream of return in their portfolio.
Sources of Funds
Equity Financing
The equity of the Company is put under the name Shareholders'
Reference to 1982 annual report.
2 Please see Table 3.2
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Funds in the annual report and is made up of Share Capital and
reserves. Share Capital is the paid-up ordinary shares at par value
($10 per share). Reserves are divided into two categories- Capital
Reserves and Revenue Reserves. The former consists of a Share
Premium Account and a Scheme of Control Account. The latter consists
of three reserve accounts- General, Plant Replacement and
Unappropriated Profits. The original relationship of the various
components of the Shareholders' Funds are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The characteristics of each instrument of equity financing with
reference to Telephone are described in the following section.
Internal Source- Funds Generated From Operations
These funds are derived from the normal business operations of
the Company. From the annual report, it can be seen that the source
is net income with adjustments for items not involving the movement
of funds. The latter usually consists of depreciation and disposal
of assets, exchange movement and provision for staff retirement
schemes.
The Company's financial operations are subjected to a Scheme of
Control, the accounting policies of which have been agreed with
Government and which are in effect from 1st January 1976. Under the
scheme, the Company's maximum permitted return on Shareholders'
Funds is 16 percent after taxation. Any surplus to this 16 percent
is apportioned as 4/5 to the Capital Reserve (Scheme of Control
Account) for issue as bonus shares at an appropriate time.
The net profit for the year, after deduction of dividends, is
accumulated to the Revenue Reserve.
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External Source- Funds From Issues of Common Stock
The Company has been issung only ordinary shares (par value is
at $10). There are no preference shares in the capital structure.
Common stock as a source of funds is appraised as follows. For
the issuer, the advantages are:
1) There is no legal obligation to pay dividends (as in 1974, no
dividend was declared due to a liquidity problem).
2) Common stock carries no fixed maturity date for the Company
and the shareholders can freely trade their shares in the
market.
3) Common stocks of utilities appeal to conservative investors
and investors who would like to balance their portfolio
because of the relatively stable stock price and high dividend
payout.
4) It broadens the equity base and improves the leverage capacity
of the Company. For Telephone, the long-term debt has a
magnitude of about one hundred million HK dollars, but the
debt rato is quite low due to the large amount of equity.
Disadvantages to the issuer of common stock are:
1) Sale of common stock is accompanied by loss of voting rights
or control to shareholders. However, this is not a serious
problem for Telephone because the new shares are alloted to
the existing shareholders proportionally, thus making little
change in their respective positions.
2) Dividends increase with the number of shares outstanding
whereas the use of debt may enable the firm to utilize funds
at a fixed lower cost.
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3) Common stock dividends are not tax deductible. The impact of
this factor is reflected in the relative cost of equity
capital vis-a-vis debt capital.
4) Flotation costs for underwriting and distributing the common
stock are usually higher than those for debt. Also a longer
time is needed for arrangement of stock issue during which the
market conditions may have changed.
For Telephone, share capital is raised in the form of rights
issues, that is, shares are provisionally offered to existing
shareholders. Each shareholder is issued an option to buy a certain
number of the new shares, for instance, in 1977, the basis was one
new share for every six shares held. The preemptive rights give
shareholders the protection of preserving their pro rata share in
the earnings and control of the Company. It can also benefit the
Company. By their ownership of common stock, investors may have
already evaluated the Company favourably. Therefore, they would
like to purchase additional shares through rights offerings thus
their use may increase shareholder loyalty.
A related advantage is that the flotation cost associated with
a rights offering is lower than the cost of a public flotation.
Telephone futher reduces the costs by deploying its clerical staff
for issue of the stock certificate.
For Telephone, the rights issues are underwritten by Jardine
Fleming Company Limited and Wardley Limited. The Company has to
pay an underwriting commission to the investment bank (in the 1976
and 1977 issues, the fee was two percent of the aggregate
subscription price of the shares). However, because of the
15
underwriting contract, the Company is assured of receiving the funds
sought and protected against uncertainties in the stock market
during the arrangement.
From 1971 to 1982, the Company had made the following rights
issues:






Besides the rights issues, the capital structure of Telephone
is also affected by the issue of warrants and bonus shares.
Warrants
A warrant is the right to purchase shares of common stock at a
stated price within a given time period. Warrants amounting to $99.3
million were issued in the rights issue in 1981. Each warrant holder
is entitled to subscribe for shares of the Company at $20.9 at any
time between October 1981 and September 1984. It was estimated that
exercise of the outstanding warrants in full would result in the
issue of approximately 4.7 million ordinary shares.
The Financial Manager of Telephone said that the warrant is a
relatively new instrument in the capital market but not an important
source of financing for the Company. Rather, it serves as an




Warrants are negotiable, that is, they can be bought and sold
in the stock exchange market, as can its corporate securities. The
warrant holders can sell the warrant and realize its value without
actually exercising it. This secondary market thus enhances its
acceptance by the public.
One desirable feature of warrants is that they generally bring
in additional funds to the Company only if such funds are needed.
If the Comapny grows and prospers, causing the price of the stock to
rise, it is likely that warrants would be exercised and would bring
in needed funds.
Bonus Issue
Another name for bonus issue is stock dividend, which is paid
in additional shares of common stock instead of cash and which
simply involves a book-keeping transfer from the Capital Reserve
Account to the Share Capital Account. From 1971 to 1982, Telephone
made the following bonus issue:
No. of Stock Dividends Issued







It can be seen that the Company has maintained a steady issue
of stock dividends for the last five years. In fact, the Financial
Manager of Telephone said that bonus issue has become part of the
dividend policy and would be followed each year to meet the
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expectation of the shareholders. Stock dividends also have the
purpose of capitalizing part of the reserves as some shareholders
hold the illusion that more dividends should be paid in view of the
large reserves.
For the Company, a stock dividend does not change either the
corporation's earnings, its assets, or its shareholders'
proportionate equity since it increases each shareholder's number of
shares by the same percentage.
Some shareholders may be quite satisfied with a stock dividend
which they can sell for cash. But in doing so, they are actually
selling a fraction of their equity in the business.
1
Weston and Brigham have pointed out that stock dividends have
effects on the stock price and the extent of stock ownership. This
study does not intend to conduct empirical research on Telephone in
this aspect, but one evidence is that the Company adjusted the
subscription price of its warrants from $20.9 to $19.0 (a drop of
9.5 percent) because of its bonus issue in that year.
The build up of the Shareholder' Funds in Telephone from 1971
to 1982 is illustrated in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3.
It can be seen that revenue reserves have been increasingly
important. In 1971, revenue reserves were 0.21 of total equity.
This was increased to 0.39 in 1975 and then to 0.48 in 1982.
Debt Financing
From the viewpoint of a long-term debt borrower, there are
i
J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham. Managerial Finance. 7th
ed. The Dryden Press, 1981.
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several advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are:
1) The cost of debt is definitely limited. Lenders do not
participate in sharing the profit of the company.
2) There is no loss of control of ownership.
3) Interest payment on debt is deductible as a tax expense.
4) Hong Kong Telephone, being a large utility company, has a good
credit rating both in Hong Kong and abroad. Therefore, there
is little difficulty in raising debts in the capital market.
Also the Company has access to export credit financing on
very favourable terms (this will be discussed in a later
section).
There are also several disadvantages of using long-term debt:
1) Since long-term debt is a commitment for a long period of
time, it inevitably involves risk. The expectations and plans
on which the debt was issued may change, and the debt may
prove to be a burden.
2) Provision must be made for repayment of the debt. If the debt
is denominated in foreign currency, hedging is necessary to
protect against foreign exchange exposure. This is particular-
ly significant for Telephone.
3) In a long-term contractual relationship, the indenture provis-
ions are likely to be much more stringent than they are in a
short-term credit agreement.
4) There is a limit on the extent to which funds can be raised
through long-term debt. When debt goes beyond the limit, its
cost may rise rapidly.
The sources and characteristics of long-term debt instruments
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used by Telephone are described in the following sections.
Export Credits
Since communication is a technology-intensive business, most of
Telephone's equipment is imported (mainly from United Kingdom, Japan
and Belgium). These foreign governments, in order to encourage such
large revenue-generating exports, have taken actions to assist the
necessary financing for Telephone:
1) Direct loans from government-backed institutions. For
instance, the Exporters' Refinance Corporation Limited, which
provides medium term finance covering the purchase of capital
equipment from the United Kingdom.
2) Commercial bank loans with the foreign government giving the
guarantee.
The maturity of Export Credits is usually three to five years
with payments at 6 month intervals. The interest rates usually range
from 7.5 percent to 8.0 percent.
In order to ensure adequate funds for long-term capital
investments, Telephone entered export credit finance contracts to
secure future cash flows. As of December 1982, the facilities
provided up to HK $327 million (though only $30 million was used as
shown in the balance sheet of 1982).
Export Credits provide favourable terms as an instrument of
long- term financing for Telephone (relatively low, fixed interest
rates). The major disadvantage is that repayments have to be made
in foreign currencies, thus exposing the Company to foreign exchange
risk. In order to hedge against this risk, Telephone buys either
20
foreign currencies deposits or enters into forward contracts in the
futures market.
Leasehold Land
This liability is the amount payable for the purchase of
leasehold land by instalment terms from the Hong Kong Government
over periods not exceeding fifteen years. The interest rates range
from 5 percent to 10 percent.
Medium Term Loans
The Company obtained two Swiss Francs loans which amounted to
Sw.Fr. 90 million (about HK$ 149.3 million) in 1973. This loan was
not repayable on an amortized basis but as a lump sum with maturity
in 1978. Interest was charged at fixed rates of 8 percent on Sw.Fr.
70 million and 7 3/4 percent on Sw. Fr. 20 million. The arrangement
was achieved by Jardine Fleming Co. Ltd. and Wardley Ltd. The loan
was made without any collateral and simply on the credit rating of
Telephone.
Since the loan was denominated in Swiss Francs and would fall
due in 1978, the Company not only had to make provision for the
repayment but also had to protect against exchange fluctuations. The
advantage of non-amortization in repayment was that the Comapny had
more time and hence more chances to take up favourable exchange
rates for hedging. Indeed, Telephone made rights issues
consecutively in 1976 and 1977 to raise funds of which the majority
was used to purchase foreign currencies to cover the liability of
the Swiss Francs loans. It is reported that Swiss Francs had
appreciated significantly against the Hong Kong Dollar in the second
half of 1977. Had the cash raised by the rights issues not been
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available, exchange losses would have eroded profits by HK $37
million.
Other Deferred Liabilities
Two other items that are classified as deferred liabilities in
the balance sheet are Staff Retirement Schemes and Deferred
Taxation.
These items are not equity and are not pure debt either. Staff
Retirement Schemes include accrued provident funds or pensions that
the Company must eventually pay to its employees. Deferred Taxation
arises from timing differences between profits as computed for
taxation purposes and profits as stated in the accounts (mostly due
to the different methods of calculating the depreciation of fixed
assets).
These liabilities do not entail any risk and require no
interest payments. This is because from the standpoint of a
going-concern, the credit balances in these two liabilities will
continue to grow as Telephone continues to increase its staff size
and to make investments in fixed assets. Also these liabilities are
not primarily for financing purposes and the balances are not
subjected to management's discretion to change for coping with the
financing needs of the Company.
In the fund flow statement, provision for Staff Retirement
Schemes is added back to funds. generated from operations as an
adjustment not involving movement of funds, just like depreciation.
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TABLE 3.1
SALES REVENUE AND NET FIXED ASSETS
HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED
Million Hong Kong Dollars
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Sales Revenue 233.3 300.0 366.6 433.3 600.0 681.1
2.
Net Fixed Assets 644.7 829.6 1041.9 1248.4 1357.0 1328.0
Fixed Assets Turnover3 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.51
Source: From annual reports of the Company.
1
Sales includes revenues for services jointly provided with other
organizations.
2
Expressed in book values as in the annual reports.
3
Fixed Assets Turnover is the ratio of Sales Revenue to Net Fixed




Million Hong Kong Dollars
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Sales Revenue 789.7 93 8.1 1142.8 1381.4 1785.4 2193.9
Net Fixed Assets 1300.5 1401.5 1588.4 1851.0 2427.9 2855.2




HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Earnings Per Share($) 2.16 2.28 2.16 1.92 2.85 3.41
Dividends Per Share($) 1.10 1.20 1.20 0 1.20 1.35
Payout Ratio 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.42 0.40




1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Earnings Per Share($) 3.67 3.51 3.76 3.12 3.30 2.88
Dividends Per Share($) 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.55 1.55
Payout Ratio 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.48 0.46 0.53
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TABLE 3.3
COMPONENTS OF SHAREHOLDERS' FUNDS
HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED
Million Hong Kong Dollars
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
SHARE CAPITAL
312.0 312.0 312.0 312.0 312.0 425.0
Share Premium
CAPITAL Account





361.8 361.8 361.8 361.8 361.8 521.7
General




Profit its 8.8 9.4 11.5 71.5 28.2
TOTAl
101.2 136.5 166.5 195.7 238.6 306.8
SHAREHOLDERS'S FUNDS1 463.0 498.3 528.3 557.5 600.4 828.5
1




Million Hong Kong Dollars
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
SHARE CAPITAL 497.0 546.7 601.4 6 91 .6 913.6 1008.1
Share Premium
CAPITAL Account 203.0 155.0 102.9 18.2 118.3 29.9
Scheme of
RESERVES Control 1.7 2.6 5.5
TOTAL 701.4 704.3 709.8 709.8 1031.9 1038.0
General 198.6 198.6 198.6 198.6 113.0 113.0
REVENUE Plant
Replacement 100.0 150.0 2 00.0 2 00.0 250.0 250.0
RESERVES
Retained
Profits 104.2 151.2 210.0 320.7 402.7 550.8
TOTAL 402.8 499.8 608.6 719.3 884.0 943.7
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CHAPTER IV
HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED- PART II:
DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY IN LONG-TERM FINANCING
Chapter III outlined the characteristics of the various
long-term financing instruments that are used by Hong Kong
Telephone. This chapter will focus in depth on two important
dimensions- what are the criteria used by management to make
debt/equity decisions and what are the policies pertinent to the
using of these instruments. The sources of information are drawn
mainly from the analysis done in Chapter III and also from an
interview with the Financial Manager of Telephone. In order to make
the study more constructive and stimulating, there are two
respective sections at the end of the chapter on the appraisal of




It is the policy of the Company to retain about 50 to 60
percent of the profits for future financing. Table 4.1 shows that
the internal source of funds is always predominant over other
sources, and it is deemed to be the backbone of support. From the
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period 1975 to 1982, funds from operation average 83 percent of the
total funds.
Financial Leverage
The debt ratio (long-term debt to net worth) increased
significantly in 1973 (from 0.28 in 1972 to 0.58 in 1973) due to the
Swiss francs loans (about HK$149 million). At that time the Company
was expanding rapidly and there was large capital expenditure in
fixed assets. That Telephone could not sustain the growth was
indicated by the emergence of a liquidity problem, and it was
forecasted that the situation would be aggravated unless there was a
substantial increase in rental charges to the consumers. The
medium-term foreign currency loan was used to alleviate the problem.
After this loan was fully repaid in 1978, the debt ratio dropped
concomitantly, and a low financial leverage has been maintained
since then.
The consistently used debt capital is export credits. The
amount rose from $92 million in 1971 to $194 million in 1974 and
then dropped back to $71.2 million. The decrease continued and
reached as low as $16 million in 1979, but it seems that there is a
reverse trend of gradual increase in recent years (the balance was
$78 million at the end of 1982).
It can be concluded that management of Telephone has been
cautious in using long-term debts. Indeed, the Company raised funds
in the stock market in 1976 and 1977 instead of procuring some other
term loans to repay the Swiss franc.
The Company has been using the ratio of long-term debt to
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shareholders' funds to measure the financial leverage. However,
management is not very concerned about this ratio nor does the
Company have a well-defined corporate debt capacity because the
leverage is always maintained at very low level (the debt ratio was
0.004 in 1982). The Finanical Manager said that there is no
explicit target financial structure, but he did not exclude the
possibility that senior manangement and staff analysts may have such
criteria in mind when they formulate the long-term financing
strategies. In calculating the costs of capital, the cost of special
sources of financing are used.
Short-Term vs Long-Term Debt
The Financial Manager said that short-term debt is used mainly
for coping with the time lag between receivables and payables and
also for some small scale fixed assets. The Company has the policy
of financing current assets with short-term debt and fixed assets
with long-term debt. The underlying philosophy is that the interest
rate of long-term debt is fixed and that the Company is conservative
in not speculating in the fluctuation of short-term interest rates.
Decision-Making Process
Choice Between Debt and Equity
The main factors in making the choice are the interest rates
and the stock market conditions. In making the analysis, management
always considers the impact of the cost of capital on the tariff
rate charged to the consumers. The techniques used for the
evaluation of the choices are confidential, and the process is
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effected by top management and consultants. If issue of shares is
the prelimary choice, then a more detail analysis would be carried
out to estimate whether the issue would be successful. Management is
more prudent when considering the issue of shares because the
implication is more far-reaching.
Management does not worry about losing control of ownership
when making rights issues. At the end of 1980, there were about
24,800 shareholders and 69 million ordinary shares outstanding. Over
60 percent of the shareholders held from 500 shares to 1,000 shares.
Thus, there were no particularly large shareholders at that time,
and a very high cost would be necessary to take over the Company.
This was illustrated in 1981 when Hong Kong Land spent about $1
billion to gain control by buying 34.1 percent of Telephone's stock.
Later, from March 1983 to February 1984, Cable Wireless had to
provide about $4 billion to take over the Company.
The decision-making process involves the Managing Director and
the Board, sometimes with the participation of bankers, especially
when there is a proposal to launch a rights issue. The whole
process, once started, takes up about 40 percent of management's
time. Therefore, long-term financing decisions are deemed to be one
of the most important top managerial assignments.
With regard to the implication of financing policy on the
valuation by the market, the Finanical Manager said that some
relationship may exist but he thought that it would not be
significant enough to arouse concern.
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Appraisal of the Long-Term Financing Policy
From the performance and financial position of Telephone, it
can be said that 1976 was the turning point of the Company. Before
1976, there was no Scheme of Control, which meant that the profit of
the Company was not guaranteed.
Before 1976
From 19 71 to 19 74, the sales revenue did show a steady increase
but the net profit after tax dropped in 1973 and dropped still
further in 1974 In these two years, the Company ran into liquidity
problems. This might be partly due to inadequate planning of the
long-term financing for rapid growth prior to the emergence of such
bad news. From the financial data during the period 1971 to 1974, it
could be said that, before 1973, management was conservative in
using external capital in financing. This could be seen in the low
leverage and in the Company's not taking advantage of the stock
market boom in 1972 and 1973 (although there was a stock issue in
1971). The major source of funds derived from operations, but then
half of the profit was given out as dividends. In addition, there
was no rental increase to customers for ten years (the last increase
was in 1964). At the same time, the Company's extremely rapid
expansion (net fixed assets increased 28 percent from 1971 to 19 72,
and 25 percent from 1972 to 1973) fueled its worst financial problem
- cash flow inadequacy. Had the Company formulated better long-term
plans to finance the investments and had it prepared for the adverse
conditions in years ahead, the problem would not have been so
serious or perhaps could even have been avoided. In order to improve
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the cash flow position, the medium-term Swiss franc loan of HK $149
million was procured in 1973 the rental rate was increased
consecutively in 1974 and 1975 and no dividend was declared in
1974. Moreover, in 1975, the Company cancelled $200 million worth
of capital equipment then on order or planned as part of the
expansion programme. Other stringent measures, such as the stopping
of all staff recruitment, were enforced. The incident aroused wide
public concern. Indeed, a Commission of Inquiry was set up by
Government to review the affairs of the Company. This finally led to
the establishment of the Scheme of Control. It is deemed that all
this confusion had far-reaching effects on the valuation of the
Company by the market. In 1976, the rights issue of Telephone was
priced at only $14 per share (compared to $20 per share in the 1971
issue).
19 76 to Present
In 1976, the Scheme of Control was set up, which established
the Company's maximum permitted return on shareholders' funds (net
worth) at 16 percent after taxation.
Because the profit of Telephone is guaranteed and there is no
competition in the market, the financial position of the Company
improved significantly after 1975. In 1976 and 1977, two consecutive
rights issues were launched, raising a total capital of $338.2
million of which $265.3 million was used to repay the Swiss franc
loan in 1978 (the original value of the loan was $149.4 million in
1973, an appreciation of 78 percent in five years). After this loan
was retired, the Company reverted to the low leverage policy and
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because of the strong cash flow, even the amount of export credits
outstanding was significantly reduced ($158.8 million in 1975, $71.2
million in 1976 and$ 78.1 million in 1982). Whether Telephone has
gained sound management of long-term financing under the umbrella of
the Scheme of Control is worthwhile to study.
Choice between Debt and Equity- A Post-Mortem Analysis
Telephone made rights issues in 1976, 1977 and 1981. The
attractiveness of the issues and the market conditions are analysed
as follows:
Shares Hang Seng Index21
Year P/EIssued (m) Price High Low
1976 11.3 4.9$14 450 350
1977 7.2 7.3$25 450 400
1981 11.9 6.4$20 1800 1100
The rights issues in 1976 and 1977 were partly in response to
Government pressure to improve the cash position and partly due to
the need to make provision for repayment of the Swiss franc loan.
Indeed, the issue in 1976 was not under favourable conditions. On
the one hand, the market had only begun its recovery from the
collapse in 1973/74. On the other hand, the bitter memory of no
dividend in 1974 was still fresh in the minds of investors. As a
result, the price of the 1976 issue had to be depressed to increase
its attractiveness. Since there is a limit of the number of shares
in a particular issue, Telephone launched another rights issue in
1Earnings are the e.p.s. at the end of the previous year.
2
Approximate value only. Please also see Appendix IV.
3Please see Hang Seng Index in Appendix IV.
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1977. The good financial performance of the Company in 1975 and 1976
secured the confidence of the shareholders, which enabled an
significant increase of the subscription price to $25 per share,
although the market conditions was not much better than that in
1976. In 1981, the Hang Seng Index once reached a record-high level,
but Telephone's rights issue was priced only at $20, perhaps because
the market was dominated by real estate companies in that period.
Judging from the price-earning ratio, the three issues were not that
satisfactory.
In 1980, the Company secured a three-year term loan of $75
million in the local capital market. The timing of this decision
seems not to have been appropriate in view of the ten percent plus
interest rate (see prime rates in Appendix IV). Indeed the loan was
rapaid before due in 1981 by funds raised in the rights issue in
that year. On the contrary, the Company did not take advantage of
the low local interest rate in 1976 and 1977 (ranging from 4.75
percent to 6.5 percent), perhaps because of the presence of the
Swiss franc loan in the capital structure. Therefore, common shares
were issued instead, even under the unfavourable conditions of 1976.
After this analysis and review, the following criticisms of the
long-term financing policy of Telephone are formulated:
1) It appears that the financing strategy of the Company is to
rely basically on funds from operations and export credits.
Only additional required funds are then raised in the
capital market on a rather ad hoc basis, i.e. only when the
need arises. Therefore, the Company does not make a
sophisticated forecast of the market conditions, nor does
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it formulate corresponding strategic plans and cost-benefit
analysis for the relative use of the different instruments
at different times.
2) Management of Telephone is very averse to using long-term
debt financing, especially local borrowings. The only cons-
istently used debt instrument is export credit, but the
amount is small compared to the annual purchase of fixed
assets. Although long-term debt is kept to a minimum, the
lack of a calculation of optimal capital structure and
a well-defined corporate debt capacity prohibit the achieve-
ment of minimal cost of capital.
The slackness in Telephone's management in long-term financing
may be caused by the following reasons:
1) The Company has a monopoly position in the market so that
its sales revenue is stable.
2) The Scheme of Control protects the downside of net profit,
i.e. the Company can always ask for a rate increase if
the permitted return is not met.
3) There is strong support from Hongkong Bank for credit
facilities.
4) Management maintains a traditional policy of minimizing long
term debt, preferring to operate on a pay-as-you-go basis.
However, since the use of funds by the Comapny is in the
magnitude of hundreds of millions each year, better management of
long-term financing and the formulation of valid decision rules for
choice among the different instruments would surely fetch great
benefits for the shareholders and the public. Therefore, some
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recommendations are proposed as follows.
Recommendations
Optimal Capital Structure- Minimizing Cost of Capital
It is generally accepted that a reasonable schedule for the
component costs of debt and equity will produce a saucer-shaped
(relatively flat over a certain range) average cost of capital
schedule. Therefore, there would be a range of capital structures
that have the lowest costs. From the interview, it is interpreted
that the cost of capital is measured by the cost of the specific
source of financing (Question 5, Appendix III). A better and more
valid approach would include the following considerations:
1) To find out the relationship of the cost of debt and equity
and hence the composite cost to the level of leverage. Then
identify the range of optimal capital structure for the
Company (such analysis has the assumption of holding the
total amount of financing capital constant, changing only
the mix of financing and then seeking optimal target debt
ratio at which the average cost of capital is at a minimum).
2) The weighted average method for cost of capital measurement
is recommended- the marginal cost of capital is calculated
using the target capital structure weights.
Debt Capacity- Limit of Borrowing
One of the reasons that management is averse to using long-term
debts is perhaps the uncertainty in future cash flow and the
fluctuation in economic conditions. The pains of the liquidity
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problem in 1973-74 can still be felt today. However, the correct
lesson that should be learned is to establish some criteria to
moniter how far the Company can incur debt, i.e. debt capacity,
1
rather than just avoiding debt. The analysis by Donaldson can
provide some guidelines for the Company to formulate its corporate
debt policy (the Company at present does not subscribe to the
concept of corporate debt capacity because the amount of debt is
very low). The main idea is to forecast the cash flow under adverse
economic conditions and the maximum amount of debt that is just
under the debt servicing ability of projected earnings.
Cash flow directly affects the liquidity of the Company, but
management is not very much concerned about current and quick
ratios. They are usually kept at low levels. The following extracts
from Table 4.2 illustrate the situation:
Al71-76 77-80 82
current ratio 0.19- 0.56 1.81- 0.85 0.69 0.55
quick ratio 0.10- 0.43 1.70- 0.73 0.57 0.42
The Financial Manager of Telephone said that the future cash
flow is always steady and that there is strong support from Hongkong
Bank for overdraft and other credit facilities. That seems to be
reasonable, but if the Company is to incur more long-term debt, the
1.
Gordon Donaldson. New Framework for Corporate Debt Policy.
Harvard Business Review (March-April, 1962).
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cash flow and liquidity positon should be closely monitored and
controlled in order to preserve adequate coverage of financial
obligations.
Timing of Financing- Management Re-focus
It seems that the Company needs to place more emphasis on
management of long-term financing. The conditions of the economies
and capital markets, both local and international, should be closely
monitored and forecasted. Favourable opportunities, such as low
interest rates and rising stock prices, should be evaluated and
exploited, even when there is no immediate need of external funds.
If outside capital is raised only when the demand arises (as
Telephone is practicing now), the Company's cost of capital is at
the mercy of the markets.
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TABLE 4. 1
A HIGHLIGHT OF SOURCE APPLICATION OF FUNDS
HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED
Million Hong Kong Dollars
1975 1976 1977 1978
Total Funds Generated 254.7 461.7 532.2 360.7
2
Funds From Operations2 254.7 303.5 352.2 360.7
Issue of Shares 158.2 180.0
Bank Loans & Export Credits
Increase (Decrease) (40.7) (109.2) (25.0) (28.6)
Funds from Operation3 100% 65% 66% 100%
Purchase of Fixed Assets 206. 5 83.8 91.5 228.5
2
Total Application of Funds 250.3 244.1 177.9 624.8
4.3Working Capital Increase (Decrease) 217.6 354.3 (264.1)
Source: From Statement of Changes In Financial Position of the
annual reports.
There is no Statement of Changes In Financial Position in the
annual reports before 1976.
1
From 1976 annual report.
2
The profits tax paid in the year has been deducted.
3The ratio is equal to Funds From Operations over Total Funds




Million Hong Kong Dollars
1979 1980 1981 1982
Total Funds Generated 432.0 534.1 860.4 854.4
Funds From Operations 432.0 448.0 548.2 739.7
Issue of Shares 236.5 6.1
Bank Loans Export Credits
Increase (Decrease) 86.1 66.0 21.2(27.5
Funds from Operation 100% 83% 63% 86%
Purchase of Fixed Assets 329.3 426. 5 784.0 709.5
Total Application of Funds 456.3 586.6 92 5.0 931.6
Working Capital Increase (Decrease) (24.3) (52.5) (64.6) (77.2)
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TABLE 4.2
CURRENT ASSETS, CURRENT LIABILITIES
AND LONG-TERM DEBTS
HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED
Million Hong Kong Dollars
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
76.0 62.1 68.2 76.8 77.6 123.4Current Assets
134.7 230.9 249.0 363.0 400.5 233.0Current Liabilities
1
92.9 118.7 160.4 194.1 158.8 71.2Deferred Creditors
Loans
6.4 20.1 143.7 180.3 175.8 172.5(Medium/Long-Term)
2
99.3 138.8 304.1 374.4 334.6 243.7Total Long-Term Debts
Source: From Balance Sheet of annual reports.
1
It is the sum of export credits and leasehold land.
2It is the sum of deferred creditors and loans (exclude deferred
taxation and staff retirement schemes).
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TABLE 4.2 (continued)
Million Hong Kong Dollars
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Current Assets 499.5 326.9 319.2 354.6 413.1 408.4
Current Liabilities 276.4 317.3 356.5 414.1 595.5 738.3
Deferred Creditors 48.2 25.5 16.0 25.4 58.0 78.1
Loans
2 09.7(Medium/Long-Term) 75.0




HONG KONG TELEPHONE COMPANY LIMITED
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Current Ratio
0.56 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.55
Quick Ratio
0.28 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.43
Long-Term Debt




0.46 0.69 1.00 1.26 1.22 0.56
Net Worth
Source: From Balance Sheet of annual reports.
For the dollar amount of the various entities, please see Table4.2.
1
It is equivalent to Shareholders' Funds.
2
Total Debt is the sum of Current Liabilities and Long-Term
Debts.
48
TABLE 4. 3 (continued)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Current Ratio 1.81 1.03 0.90 0.85 0.69 0.55
Quick Ratio 1.70 0.90 0.77 0.73 0.57 0.42
Long-Term Debt
0.23 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04
Net Worth
Total Debt




CHINA LIGHT POWER COMPANY LIMITED
Every year China Light Power Company, Limited puts hundreds
of million dollars into capital expenditure for the purpose of
meeting the ever-increasing local demand for electricity. No only
this amount of capital expenditure is significant to the Company,
but also its absolute amount is impressively large compared to the
size of the local capital market. Therefore it is worth looking at
how the Company collects this huge amount of money.
First, the writers studied fully the annual reports of the
Company (from 1971 to 1982). For ease in examining the Company's
changes in different financial aspects, data and figures have been
extracted from the annual reports and have been put into tables,
from 5.1 to 5. 4, showing such changes throughout the period. These
tables are placed at the end of this chapter.
The Growth of the Company
A high growth rate was the most obvious characteristic of China
Light Power Company, Limited in respect to total assets,
shareholder's funds and turnover rate. Through the twelve years
under review (from 1971 to 1982), fixed assets increased from$
653.8 m to$ 3,978.9 m, reflecting an increase of more than 500%.
Within these twelve years, the shareholder's funds exhibited a rapid
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increase from$ 568 m to$ 3,081 m. This increase is nearly 450%,
which is only slightly less than the increase in fixed assets. Due
to the high efficiency of modern machinery, the rate of increase in
turnover is well above both the rate of increase in fixed assets and
in shareholders' funds. The turnover increased from$ 443.4 m in
1971 to$ 4,765.4 m in 1982, exhibiting an increase of about 1000%.
The Increase in Long-Term Debt
Matching the rapid expansion of the Company, the long-term debt
had been rapidly climbing, especially after 1979 as the Company
started to use bank loans in addition to deferred creditors for
financing. In 1971, the total long-term debt, including rate
reduction reserve, amounted to only$ 5.2 m. But in 1982, the total
was already$ 750 m. An increase of 143 times!
As the long-term debt grew much faster than the shareholder's
funds, it implied that the long-term debt/equity ratio should have
been increasing during these twelve years. Actually, this ratio
increased from only 0.009 in 1971 to about 0.240 in 1982, but the
increase was especially rapid in the last four years. By looking at
the change in this debt ratio alone, one can make the preliminary
conclusion that the attitude of the Company had changed toward
employing more debt for financing expenditures.
While the Company became more willing to increase the
proportion of debt to the total amount of funds for various
applications, the annual reports revealed that each year the Company
arranged loan facilities amounting to thousands of millions of
dollars available for the purposes of financing. However, these loan
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facilities were always much larger than the loans outstanding. This
underutilization of loan facilities seemed to be inconsistent with
the Company's policy of using more debt for financing.
The Increase in Current Liabilities
In addition to long-term debt, the current liabilities, which
were composed of bank overdrafts, consumer deposits, current
accounts, etc. also provided another source of funds, though on a
short-term basis. Although the increasing rate of current
liabilities was less than that of total long-term debt, the amount
of current liabilities still had increased by several fold between
1971 and 1982. And its size had become comparable to that of the
total long-term debt. Obviously, the current liabilities were
different from long-terril, debt regarding the length of maturity and
the denominating currencies. They should be regarded as two
different kinds of debt and should serve different types of
financing purposes. The current ratio is the financial ratio for
revealing the liquidity of the assets. This ratio is defined as
current asset divided by current liabilities. If this ratio is high,
that means the company's assets are liquid and the company is more
likely to be able to meet any payment obligation. For most years
between 1971 to 1982, the current ratios of China Light Power
Company, Limited were within the range from 0.3 to 0.7. Although
there is not any industry standard to act as a reference for
commenting on the current ratios of China Light, as this range was
well-below one, a sense inadequate liquidity in assets could be
felt. However, the Company must have had their reasons for
maintaining such a level.
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The Growth in Share Capital
In accordance with the rapid expansion of the Company, the
shareholder's funds have grown rapidly. The share capital increased
from$ 300 m in 1971 to$ 2,400 m in 1982. Within most of these
years under review, the share capital had been raised either by
rights issue or scrip issue. Scrip issue was a free issue to the
current shareholders, representing capitalization of amounts
standing to the credit of reserve accounts. The timing and other
details of these both kinds of issues between 1971 and 1982 are
shown below:
Other DetailsSchedule of Rights Issues
3 m s Bares@ $25, premium@ $151972
1.6 m shares@ $20, premium@ $101974
6.25 m shares@ $101975
20 m shares@ $15, premium@ $51979
40 m shares@ $15, premium@ $5,1981
one share@ $10 subdivided
into two shares@ $5
nrhor DetailsSchedule of Scrip Issues
18.9 m shares@ $101974
31.25 m shares@ $101977
40 m shares@ $101980
Although both the rights issue and scrip issue would cause
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increases in the share capital account, they bear different
implications as methods of capital raising. Scrip issue does not
bring about any inflow of capital as it is only a capitalization
process of rearranging the equity accounts while the total amount
remains constant. On the contrary, a rights issue is one way for
actual fund raising, as outside funds will be channelled into the
company. Clearly, it is another method of external financing, such
as arranging long-term debt. China Light Power Company, Limited
has been employing both rights issue and long-term debt as external
financing methods. Of course, the Company should have had guidelines
or policies to govern the respective extent to which these two
methods could be utilized.
Admittedly, the annual reports of China Light had been
disclosing adequate and comprehensive information on company
activities, in particular those relating to finance. Due to this
reason, China Light was awarded first place in the public utilities
category of the 1981 Annual Report Competition, organised by the
Hongkong Management Association. However, there were still some
things that had not been fully disclosed, especially the intangible
aspects, such as what factors the Company would consider in deciding
which financing methods should be used.
In order to make the whole picture completely clear, an
interview with Mr. Broadhurst, the division head of Finance and
Administration, was arranged on 1st March, 1984. In the interview,
about twenty questions were asked. (These questions are shown in
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Appendix II III.) Mr. Broadhurst was very kind to give the answers
as fully as he could.
Summary of Mr. Broadhurst's Explanations
ECGD Loans
China Light Power Company, Limited had been using Export
Credits to finance the purchases of fixed assets from U.K.. This
source of funds did have a number of attractive advantages. This
credit facility was available to finance up to 85% of the total
purchase. `Usually 5% of the purchase had to be paid as prepayment
and the remaining 10% was paid on shipment.) Actually, this kind of
loan came from syndicates consisting mainly of international banks.
The Export Credits Guarantee Department acted as the guarantor of
the loan and also subsidized the interest asked by the lenders. The
consensus interest rates applicable to the ECGD loans always ranged
from 7.25 per cent to 8 per cent per annum. However, the banks might
ask for a higher interest rate. Then the difference between this
required rate and the consensus rate was the part the ECGD
subsidized. Under this arrangement, China Light could obtain a cheap
supply of funds while not needing to provide any guarantee itself.
Factors Under Consideration
The repayment schedule, which was generally on a biannual
basis, was the Company's greatest concern in employing the ECGD
loans. Primarily, the repayment schedule had to be fit with the
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timing of the Company's fund flow position throughout the repayment
period. Another thing that the Company had to look at was the
foreigh exchange risk as the loans were usually denominated in
foreign currencies. China Light would suffer a great loss if the
Hongkong dollar had devaluated against these foreign currencies
before the repayments. The foreign exchange risk grew more
significant as in the last few years the value of Hongkong dollar
did fluctuated widely. One thing the Company could not overlook in
deciding the use of the loans, of course, was the interest rate.
Reasons for the Under-utilization
There was an earlier observation that the Company had been
arranging loan facilities for financing and that the facilities were
usually underutilized. In 1980, the annual report showed that there
were loan facilities of HK$ 1,055.6 m. But the sum of loan and
deferred creditors was only about HK$ 320 m. The reason, for the
most part, for this temporary underutilization was explained by Mr.
Broadhurst as being that the loans required for a whole project,
which usually lasted for a number of years, were arranged in
advance. The size of the loan facilities should approximately equal
the money required for the whole project. Therefore, before the
project was completed, it was natural that there would be some
underutilization of the loan' facilities assigned for that project.
Mr. Broadhurst also explained that to avoid a shortage of funds-,




Besides the ECGD loans, the Company had also been using bank
overdrafts for financing purposes on a short-term basis. As this
kind of loan was denominated in the local currency, it was without
any currency exposure. Therefore, the loan was very suitable for
financing the expenditures that originated from Hong kong.
Liquidity of Assets
Even though the rather low level of the Company's current ratio
apparently showed that the assets were not quite liquid, according
to Mr. Broadhurst, China Light was not concerned about the liquidity
problem. The major reason was that the Company's income had been
protected or guaranteed by government. As long as funds from
operations kept coming, the liquidity status was not a matter for
concern.
Timing of Rights Issues
In addition to different kinds of debt, rights issues have also
been employed for financing expenditures. Within the twelve years
under review, rights issues have been used five years. (The schedule
of rights issues was shown previously.) Why did the Company choose
these five years to issue their shares? One of the reasons was that
the Company needed money at these times. But other factors were also
considered in deciding the timing of the issues. They included the
prevailing P/E ratio, economic environment, stock market condition,
etc. However, after the PRC and the U.K. started to negotiate the
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political future of Hongkong, the confidence in the colony became
the most important factor in deciding whether to have right issues
or not.
Bonus Issues
A bonus issue, unlike a rights issue, was not a way for funds
raising. Hence, fewer factors were considered in making bonus
issues.
On issuing new shares, the management appeared not very
concerned about the loss of control of ownership or of other kinds
of control. This may be due to the fact that the major shareholders
have had kept safe amounts of shares at all times.
Internal Financing Method
Although the Company had been utilizing a huge amount of
external funds from rights issues or borrowing, the internally
generated funds were also significant. Indeed, there was an
agreement with the government restricting the dividend payout ratio
at a level around 0.5. That means that about half of the total
earnings of each year had to be retained for reinvestment purpose.
How to Select between Debt Equity
In employing the externally generated funds, there were a.
number of factors that the Company considered in choosing between
debt and equity for a given investment project. The most important
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factors were the respective sales growth and availability of funds
from these two sources. The next important factor was the financial
leverage benefit brought about by employing funds from alternative
sources. To further ease the decision, some quantitative analysis
was used. Cash flow projection was the analysis most commonly used
by the Company. Nevertheless, as the political future of Hongkong
recently became unclear, the management has had a more favorable
attitude toward using debts for financing purposes.
Target Capital Structure
Did the Company have a target capital structure? Mr Broadhurst
said that the Company did not have any. But instead there was a
limit on the Company's capital structure. Its capital structure,
under the limit, was expressed in the terms of long-term debt/equity
ratio. Here the long-term debt was defined as deferred creditors
plus bank loans plus deferred taxation. According to Mr Broadhurst,
this limit was so far established at the level of 1:1. The
commercial bankers who provided the loans and ECGD were the parties
who jointly established the level of this limit. Although the
long-term/equity ratio of the Company had increased rapidly from




CHINA LIGHT POWER COMPANY LIMITED
MILLION HONG KONG DOLLARS





260 220 275 190 265 345RESERVE
RESERVE UNAP PROPR
8 9.5 11 11.3 11.2 13.5EARNINGS
268 229.5 286 201.3 276.2 358.5TOTAL
568 694.5 751 842.3 979.7 1062.0SHAREHOLDERS' FUNDS
92.2 80.8 77.9 61.5 63.0 93.6DEVELOPMENT FUNDS
660.2 775.3 828.9 903.8 1042.7 1155.6T OTAL
Note: Share Premium was capitalized during 1974, 1977 and 1980.
There were Rights Issues in 1972, 1974, 1975, 1979 and 1980.




MILLION HONG KONG DOLLARS
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982EQUITY
1000 1000 1200 1600 2400 2400SHARE CAPITAL
100SHARE PREMIUM
1000 1000 1300 1600 2 400 2400TOTAL
GENERAL
140 240 340 225 25 25RESERVE
RESERVE UNAPPROPR.
11.7 6.2 10.8 15.8 287.3 656.3EARNINGS
151.7 246.2 350.8 240.8 312.3 681.3TOTAL
1151.7 124 6.2 1650.8 1840.8 2712.3 3 081 .3SHAREHOLDERS' FUNDS
137.2 196.8 169.6 164.4 178.1 228DEVELOPMENT FUNDS
1288.9 1443.0 1820.4 2005.2 2890.4 3309.3TOTAL
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TABLE 5.2
CURRENT ASSETS, CURRENT LIABILITIES
FIXED ASSETS, EARNINGS AND PAYOUT RATIO
CHINA LIGHT POWER COMPANY LIMITED
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
144.5116.277.553.255.223. 7CURRENT ASSETS
17.517.914.710.310.48.8INVENTORY




949.7 1010.3866.9789.6738.2653.8FIXED ASSET ($M)
1.070.970.860.650.66FIXED ASSET TURNOVER 0.68




Note: TURNOVER includes that of associated subsidiary companies.










4309.1 4765.41736.9 2579.61218.6 1364.6TURNOVER ($M)
3225.8 3978.91444.3 2151.81093.3 1179.0FIXED ASSET ($M)
1.201.341.201.201.16FIXED ASSET TURNOVER 1.11







CHINA LIGHT POWER COMPANY LIMITED
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
5.2 20.4 19.3 32.6 23.6 24.8
DEFERRED CREDITOR ($M
BANK LOANS ($M)




1155.7 1291.0 1395.0962.2 1035.0820.0TOTAL ASSET ($M)
237.0246.52 40. 1189. 5166.9137.6TOTAL DEBT ($M)
0.170.190.210.180.170.17TOTAL DEBT
TOTAL ASSET
0.24 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.22TOTAL DEBT
TOTAL WORTH
TOTAL CAPITAL-
5 73.2 714.9 7 70.3 874.9 1003.3 1086.8
IZATION ($M)
0.009 0.029 0.026 0.039 0.024 0.023LONG-TERM DEBT
NET WORTH
0.009 0.029 0.025 0.037 0.024 0.023LONG-TERM DEBT
7TOTAL CAPITALIZATION
Note: TOTAL DEBT= CURRENT LIABILITIES+ DEFERRED CREDITORS
+ BANK LOANS




1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
23.5 19.9 35.8 98.3 110.1 71.8
DEFERRED CREDITORS
34.3 222.3 580.0 680.9
BANK LOANS ($M)




5422.7 4383.12399.5 2969.21577.4 1735.6TOTAL ASSET ($M)
1871.5552. 1 905.6 1447.2280.8283.3TOTAL DEBT ($M)
0.430.270.300.230.160.18TOTAL DEBT
TOTAL ASSET




1175.2 1266.1 1720.9 2161.4 3402.4 3834.0
IZATION ($M)
0.020 0.016 0.042 0.174 0.254 0.240LONG-TERM DEBT
NET WORTH




A HIGHLIGHT OF SOURCE APPLICATION OF FUNDS
CHINA LIGHT POWER COMPANY LIMITED
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
237.5 165.4 208.4 248.6 256.5
TOTAL FUNDS GE NERATED ($M)
149.3 165.4 167.7 186.1 254.7
FUNDS FROM OPERATION ($M)
INCREASE IN DEFERRED
1.8(9. 2)8.613.2 (4.6)LIABILITIES ($M)
62.532.075.0SHARE ISSUING ($M)
99.374.980.410062.9OF FUNDS FROM OPERATION
217.6238.3191.2 221.3220.0APPLICATION OF FUNDS ($M)




17.5 (25.8) (12.9) 10.3 38.9
INCREASE (DECREASE) ($M)
9.5 11.6 9.7DEFERRED TAXATION ($M)
0.021 0.043 0.050 0.024 0.023TOTAL DEB T
NET WORTH
Note: FUNDS FROTI OPERATION are those that include dividends from
associated companies, and are after tax.




1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
3 38.4 3 55.5 6 82.1 74 0. 5 1587.9 1186.8
TOTAL FUNDS GENERATED ($M)
350.4 355.5 331.5 486.2 688.1 1028.6
FUNDS FROM OPERATION ($M)
INCREASE IN DEFERRED
(1.3) (3.6) 50.2 250.5 282.5 149.6LIABILITIES ($M)
600.03 00.0S HARE ISSUING ($M)
86. 743.365. 748.6100.0 100.0OF FUNDS FROM OPERATION
1547.0 1532.9570.3 1134. 1266.9 340.1APPLICATION OF FUNDS ($M)




71.6 15.4 111.8 (393.6) 40.9 (346.1)INCREASE (DECREASE) ($r1)
7.9 33.8 121.7 204.7DEFERRED TAXATION ($M)




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHINA LIGHT POWER COMPANY, LIMITED
The annual reports of China Light Power Company, Limited have
always been comprehensive in disclosing relevant financial
information to the public. Mr. Broadhurst's interview adequately
supplemented the information that was required for full
understanding of the Company's financial position. This
supplementary information has been summarized and put in Chapter V.
With this understanding of the financial picture, we can make some
recommendations for the financial policy of the Company.
On Financial Leverage
For a profitable company like China Light, financial leverage
should be a good method of obtaining a higher rate of return. As
1
mentioned before, China Light has cheap sources of funds for capital
expenditures, and the annual permitted return includes 13.5% of the
average net fixed assets. Therefore, a net benefit is guaranteed in
using a given amount of funds to finance a capital investment as
long as the incremental permitted return is really greater than the




extra interest expenses incurred. According to this argument, the
e. p. s. can be raised simply by employing more debts instead of
equity to finance the capital expenditures provided that the
debt/equity ratio is not yet too high. Indeed, there is a
1
restriction on the Company's long-term debt/equity ratio. This
restriction, which was set jointly by the commercial bankers and
ECGD, prevents the long-term debt/equity of the Company from going
over the level of 1:1. This restriction can be interpreted as the
ceiling on the financial leverage that can be reached by using more
debts. In the light of this restriction, how much financial leverage
was being used by China Light Power Company, Limited? In most of
the years under review, the long-term debt/equity ratio was below
0.1. And it was not until after 1979 that the ratio rapidly
increased. However, the level of 0.311 was still far below the
ceiling level- 1.0. In other words, the Company has not fully used
its resources to obtain greater financial leverage. There was still
room for the Company to use a greater portion of debt in financing
the capital expenditures. The writers would thus recommend that the
Company increases its long-term debt/equity ratio to at least 0.5.
I
The definition of long-term debt here is deferred creditors plus
bank loans plus deferred taxation.
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On Timing the Use of Bank loans
For increasing its long-term debt/equity ratio, the Company
should specifically borrow more from deferred creditors whose
interest rates are rather low and stable with time.
Actually, China Light had increased the size of its deferred
liabilities in the latter part of the years under review. But the
percent of the increase, relative to total long-term debt, had been
dropping very rapidly since the Company started to use large amounts
of bank loans in 1979. In 1979, both deferred creditors and bank
loans, respectively, occupied about half of the total long-term
debts. However, in 1982, the size of bank loans had already covered
about 90% of the total long-term debts.
Using more bank loans was, no doubt, one of the ways to
increase the financial leverage. But bank loans carry some relative
disadvantages with respect to deferred creditors. For instance, the
interest rates of major part of these bank loans were always less
favourable than that of deferred creditors. And they also fluctuated
with the prevailing market lending rates instead of being fixed
within a narrow range, like those of deferred creditors. Therefore,
whether using bank loans had brought considerable financial leverage
for the Company depended on the timing of their use. That is, if
the Company succeeded in using many bank loans for financing when
the market lending rate was low and using fewer bank loans when the
lending rate was high, then the use of this kind of funds would have
been very beneficial to the Company. Most important to obtaining
greatest financial leverage by employing bank loans is the capital
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investment planners' ability to accurately predict the prevailing
interest rate when the projects were carried out and funds were
needed.
The Company's timing in employing bank loans for financing
purposes is evaluated and monitored in the amount of bank loans
shown in the balance sheet of each year's annual report. Bank loans
first appeared in 1979 amounting to$ 34.3 m. After that, the
amount climbed rapidly and continuously up to$ 680.9 m. In Appendix
V, there is a table showing the levels of the best lending rate of
the local banks between 1971 and 1982. (In Appendix VI, there is a
corresponding table showing the bank lending rates in the U.K..)
Since the bankloans shown in the balance sheet consisted of foreign
loans (especially from U.K.) as well, the lending rates of both
local banks and U.K. banks were used as reference. The relative
position of these lending rates could indicate whether the interest
rates of the bank loans, if any, currently employed by the Company,
were high or low. This illustration did reveal that the market
lending rates had increased rapidly since early 1978 in both
Hongkong and the U.K. In January 1978, the local best lending rate
was only 4.75% (7.5% in U.K.) per annum. In January 1979, it went
up to 9.5% (14% in U.K.) per annum. In January 1980, it had
increased to 14.5% (18% in U. K.) per annum. And in January 1981, it
was further raised to 17% (13.75% in U.K.) per annum. In October
1981, it reached its historically highest level- 20% per annum.
Although the best lending rate was declining in 1.982, the average
throughout this year was still above 14% (12.5% in U.K) per annum.
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In the light of the high lending rates between 1979 and 1982,
the rapid expansion of bank loans by the Company in these four years
could be judged as unwise. With the high cost of capital caused by
heavy use of this kind of loan during these years, the financial
leverage gained by the Company was small.
For the sake of optimizing its financial leverage, the writers
suggest that the Company make every attempt to improve its ability
to predict future interest rates. Although there is no way to
predict accurately what the interest rate will be, say one or two
years in the future, a rough profile of the trend in the years ahead
is helpful for a good timing in the use of bank loans. It is
particularly important in a place such as Hongkong where the
interest rate is always changing. The efforts that the Company would
invest in developing its prediction ability to more accurately
predict interest rates will surely be justified by resulting gains
in return.
On Timing of Rights Issues
The Company has occasionally used rights issues to raise
capital. When Mr. Broadhurst was asked, in the interview, what
factors the management would consider in the timing of rights
issues, he mentioned that the current stock market condition had
always been the most important factor. It was natural that a company
tended to issue their shares when there was a boon in the stock
market. Then it was more likely that the company could successfully
collect the required amount of capital while at a favourable price.
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In order to evaluate whether China Light's timing in right
issues was good or bad, the writers studied the stock market
conditions throughout the twelve years under review, in particular
when the Company made rights issues.
In Appendix IV, there is a graph showing the high-low levels
and close levels of Heng Seng Index in each year between 1971 and
1982. According to this graph, the Heng Seng Index reached two
peaks in 1973 and 1981, respectively, while it reached the bottom of
the trough in 1974.
Before more thoroughly evaluating the timing of those rights
issues, the writers have assigned three levels status of stock
market conditions, based on the levels of the Heng Seng Index. The
three status levels are, namely, HIGH, INTERMEDIATE and LOW. The
corresponding range of Heng Seng Index for each of these three
status levels is shown in the following.





Usually the Heng Seng Index fluctuated so widely in a given year
that it might have covered intervals belonging to more than one
status, so the year's average level was used as the reference.
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With the aid of the graph in Appendix IV, the contemporary
stock market conditions during the five rights issues by China Light
can be seen. They are exhibited in the following illustration
showing the corresponding status levels, which have just been
described.






It can be seen that in the last three rights issues (1975, 1979
and 1980), when the stock market condition improved from Low to
High, the number of shares issued increased accordingly. Also the
price of the issues did improve with the stock market condition.
The percent of the total shares issued during each of the three
stock market status levels has been calculated and is shown in the
following.






56.3 percent of the total shares was issued during the High
stock market status level, and another 32.4 percent was issued
during the Intermediate stock market status level. The shares issued
during the Low stock market status level accounted for only 11.3
percent.
Based on the findings in the above analysis, the timing of
rights issues of China Light is recognized as fairly good,
especially for the last rights issue. It was very wise for the
management to issue the largest number of shares in the year that
the Heng Seng Index reached its highest level.
It is a fact that the Company might not be entirely free in
choosing the time for the rights issues. The Company should issue
shares only when its needs capital. If the Company wants to assure a
cheaper capital supply from issuing shares, it must employ effective
forecasting concerning the stock market and the important factors
that would affect the former. Then the Company can decide when to
have rights issues and can adjust its investment projects, if
necessary. So its investment schedule can thus match the timing of
the capital inflows in order to fund the projects on time.
China Light Power Company, Limited does appear to have this
forecasting ability. Nevertheless, the writers recommend that it
further develops this ability, making it even more accurate and
reliable so as to obtain an even cheaper supply of capital.
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CHAPTER VII
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES IN
LONG-TERM FINANCING
The previous chapters are concentrated on independent studies
of the two companies, Telephone and China Light. For additional
coherency and information, this chapter adopts a wider perspective
by bringing some other public utility companies into the picture for
a composite study over a five-year period (1978-82). Although
these companies are involved in different business, they have two
important aspects in common- (1) franchised rights for service, and
(2) large annual capital expenditures. This section is based on
financial data from the companies' annual reports. Areas selected
for comparison include debt ratio, payout ratio, timing of rights
issues, price-earning ratio and types of financing instruments.
Besides Telephone and China Light, the other public ut it i tes are:
Hong Kong Electric Holdings Limited
• The Hong Kong China Gas Company, Limited
The Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Company, Limited
Dividend Policy
All the companies pay out a high proportion of their earnings
as dividends. The payout ratios, as shown in Table 7.1, are always
over 40 perecent and may be up to 60 percent. Such high payout is
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deemed to be one attribute of public utilities that attracts
investors.
Stock dividends are also issued by most companies, particularly
Telephone, which had such issues for five consecutive years from
1978 to 1982. Indeed it has become the policy of the Company. On the
contrary, China Gas had no such issue for this five-year period. In
between the extremes, the use of stock dividends seems to be
discretionary as an attraction for existing stockholders prior to a
rights issue. For instance, before their rights issues in 1981,
China Light and Yaumati gave bonus issues in 1980.
Leve rage
From Table 7.3, it can be concluded that the sum of bank loans
and deferred creditors for the utility companies is about 10 to 25
percent of equity. The exception is Telephone which consistently
exhibits low leverage (the long-term debt to equity ratio was 0.04
in 1983).
One interesting feature is that China Light has a low level of
debt for the Company but if China Light and its Associated Companies
are taken together, the combined leverage has been at a very high
level since 1980 (debt ratio was 0.89 in 1981 and 0.91 in 1982).
Since these Associated Companies are not public, there is not as
much concern for the effect of debt on their valuation by the market
as for that of China Light itself.
Hong Kong Electric is a very diversified holding company. Thus
it is not unexpected that the leverage of the Group is significantly
higher than that of the Company (about double). However, in the
consolidated balance sheet, no long-term liabilities except
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unsecured loan stock are put under the name of the Company.
Long-Term Financing Instruments
From the information in the annual reports, only China Light
and Telephone state that they have export credit financing. The
other public utility companies do not give information in their
annual reports about whether they can obtain this favourable source
of financing.
The smaller companies, Yaumati and China Gas, have bank loans
that have to be secured by their assets. It is also likely that the
terms of their loans are more stringent than those of the large
companies like China Light and Telephone.
All five companies made rights issues in either 1980 or 1981.
Indeed there was a boom in the stock market which was conducive to
raising capital. Table 7.2 shows that the price-earning ratios for
the issues were over ten except for Telephone, which was about six
for its issue in 1981. It seems that Telephone's stock might have
been underpriced in this incidence, but this might increase its
attractiveness in the competition for funds of the shareholders who
would like to invest in public utility stocks.
Warrants are issued by Telephone and Hong Kong Electric but not
by the others. For Telephone, exercising of warrants made in 1981
resulted in the issue of only 4.7 million ordinary shares, which was
about 5 percent of the total 91.4 million shares issued by the end
of 1981. For Hong Kong Electric, exercise of the warrants (issued
in 1979) in full will result in the issue of approximately 122.5
million shares, which was 30 percent of the 635 million shares
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outstanding at the end of 1979.
Hong Kong Electric has employed a unique financing instrument
that has not been used by the other four utilities. An issue of
unsecured loan stock (1988/92) under the name of the Company was
made by way of rights to shareholders in 1979. The amount totalled
$ 635 million and carries interest at 9.25 percent. The loan stock is
subjected to an annual sinking fund from 31.12.88 to 31.12.92, which
will redeem approximately 80 percent of the loan stock prior to
final maturity and will result in the maximum average life of the
loan stock being approximately ten years. Warrants amounting to $635
million (the same worth as the loan stock) were issued at the same
time. The option period is between 1980 and 1988 and hence is
complementary to the redemption period of the 9.25 percent unsecured
loan stock, which is from 1988 to 1992. The funds from exercising of
the warrants may possibly be intended to repay the loan stock.
There is no preferred stock in the capital structure of the
public utilities under study.
Comments
Funds generated from operations are the main source of
financing in public utilities. Internal capital is a reliable and
steady source because of the franchised rights of utility services.
However, for China Gas and Yaumati, the situation is not so
favourable as they confront various types of indirect competition.
Therefore, these two companies have to be relatively more dependent
on external funds.
Hong Kong Electric seems to be not so conservative as the
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others in the management of long-term financing. Apart from
borrowing, it also utilizes extensively both warrants and unsecured
loan stock, which are traded on the stock exchange as the secondary
market, to raise external funds for the Group's expansion and
diversification.
China Light significantly increased its leverage after 1979. In
view of the Company's growth and involvement in the nuclear power
plant in Shenzhen, it is expected that more borrowing will have to
take place in the near future.
Telephone seems to be more conservative in borrowing than the
others. However, since the Company was recently taken over by Cable







OF THE FIVE PUBLIC UTILTY COMPANIES
Dividends Per Share($)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
1
China Light 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.52 0.59
Telephone 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.55 1.55
Hong Kong Electric 0.48 0.43 0.54 0.54 0.6
3
China Gas 0.87 0.95 1.05 1.20 N.A.
Yaumati Ferry 1.20 1.40 1.10 0.15 0.15
Source: From annual reports of the respective companies.
1
There was a stock split of two for one
2 There was a stock split of ten for one.
3




197 8 197 9 1980 1981 1982
0.46 0.49 0.420.51 0.56China Light
0.460.43 0.48 0.530.40Telephone
0.48 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.53Hong Kong Electric
0.61 0.59 0.55 0.58China Gas N.A.
Yaumati Ferry 0.51 0.49 0.430.47 0.59
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TABLE 7.2
PRICE-EARNING RATIO IN RIGHTS ISSUES
OF THE FIVE PUBLIC UITILTY COMPANIES
1
Price-Earning Ratios
1978 197 9 1980 1981 1982
China Light N. A 7.6 N.A. 13.6 N.A.
3
Telephone N.A. N.A. N. A. 6.4 N.A.
3
Hong Kong Electric N. A. N.A. 11.5 N.A. N. A.
China Gas N.A. N.A. 11.4 N.A. N. A.
Yaumati Ferry N.A. N. A. N.A. 20.0 N.A.
Source: The rights issue price and earnings per share are taken
from annual reports.
1
It is defined as the rights issue price divided by the
earnings per share of the year prior to the issue.
2
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LONG-TERM DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO
OF THE FIVE PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
2
Group 0.006 0.24 0.72 0.89 0.91
China Ligh
Company 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.22 0.24
Telephone 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04
Hong Ko ng Group 0.08 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.32
Electric
3
Company 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.13
China Gas 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.14 N.A.
Yaumati Ferry 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.21
Long-term debts include deferred creditors and loans but
exclude other deferred liabilities such as deferred taxation and
consumer deposit. Net worth is the same as Shareholders' Funds.
China Light Power and its Associated Companies.
For Hong Kong Electric Group, the only long-term debt put








It has been very worth while studying the Long-term financing
of the two public utility companies- Hong Kong Telephone Company,
Limited and China Light Power Company, Limited. It was certainly a
very good learning experience for the participants, especially
through the interviews with the management personnel of these two
public utilities.
The Annual Reports of both companies within the twelve years
(1971- 1982) were studied first. This process provided valuable
financial background, which was essential to subsequent studies.
Particular attention was paid to the capital structure, long-term
financing instruments, debt ratios and so on. The pictures
concerning various aspects in the field of long-term financing for
the respective companies then became clearer. In order to further
sharpen the whole picture, interviews with the management people of
these two public utility companies were arranged. The interviews
granted an opportunity for face-to-face discussions. Questions about
the company policies, strategies, and attitudes, as well as other
touchy matters were ventured. Thanks to the interviewees, all the
questions were satisfied to the greatest possible extent.
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With all the collected information on hand, the policies and
practices concerning the long-term financing of the two companies
became very clear. These were organized and mentioned in the
previous chapters. Moreover, some recommendations were suggested,
which were also described earlier.
i) Hong Kong Telephone Company, Limited
Hong Kong Telephone Company, Limited seems to have no target
capital structure. At least, the middle level people working with
finance, who were interviewed, have not sensed the presence of such
a target capital structure. But in reviewing the debt/equity ratio
of the Company between 1971 and 1982, the writers noted that this
ratio was at a rather low level. Was the Company trying deliberately
to utilize only a minute amount of debt? This question remains to be
answered. However, it can be said with that the Company had been
too conservative in using financial leverage. Hong Kong Telephone
Company, Limited had the ability to borrow more middle-to-long term
loans with favourable terms. It is certain that the Company could
have had a better earning performance if it had maintained a higher
Long-term debt/equity ratio.
Hong Kong Telephone Company, Limited seems less serious than
many multinational corporations, such as Exxon Corporation, in its
financial management. This impression might not be strictly correct,
but it is with sound evidence. Anyway, it seemed all right for the
Company to pay loose attention to the improvement of its financial
management. The reason obviously is that, as a public utility
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company, its profits and even the company as a whole are 'protected'
under the name of Schemes of Control.
The writers strongly recommend that the Company make more
efficient use of its financial resources, of course for its own
benefits. In 1981, a new subsidiary of the Company, known as
Communication Services, Limited, commenced business. Unlike its
parent company, this subsidiary is not protected or controlled by
the Scheme of Control Statement. In other words, its earnings will
not be guaranteed. The new company must make profits solely with
their management skills and expertise. The improvement in financial
management in this subsidiary then becomes particularly important.
ii) China Light Power Company, Limited
Not like Hong Kong Telephone, China Light had a ceiling
restriction on the Company's long-term debt/equity ratio. The
restriction prevented the ratio from being beyond the level of 1:1.
For most of the years between 1971 and 1982, the long-term
debt/equity ratio was well below this ceiling level. It was only
around 0.1, and it was too low. There were opportunities for the
Company to utilize more financial leverage. The writers recommend
that the Company raise its long-term debt/equity ratio.
Other recommendations on timing of rights issues and debt
raising were also made and have been mentioned previously. China
Light Power Company, Limited is the largest public utility company
in Hong Kong. Each year it put a large amount of money into capital
expenditures. Therefore, financial management is very important to
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such a large company. Indeed, China Light has many specialists
working with financing the development projects. Sophisticated
sensitivity analysis is being employed. And various important
factors, such as the future foreign exchange rate etc, are
considered along with those quantitative methods. The Company can
be said to have a very strong financial management team. However,
even with such strong human assets, an inappropriate corporate
policy still can bring poor performance in earnings.
Outlook
i) Hong Kong Telephone Company, Limited
With their recent development, Hong Kong Telephone and China
Light are likely to have bright futures.
In early February 1984, Britain's Cable Wireless PLC made a
US$ 400 m of fer (HK$ 46 a share) to buy the remaining shares of its
Hong Kong Telephone Company affiliate. Cable Wireless had
previously perchased a 34.8% stake in Hong Kong Telephone during
March 1983, mainly from Hong Kong Land Company. Cable Wireless
then succeeded to acquire a majority stake of Hong Kong Telephone,
bringing its holdings to 79% of the utility's total shares.
The takeover by Cable Wireless should result in a positive
synergic effect. Mr. Pemberton, Cable Wireless's Far East
director, said the offer was being made consistent with our longer
term strategy to rationalize resources. He said the takeover would
enable the two companies to both make significant investments, but
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avoid investment overlap.
Mr. Pemberton also cited China as a reason for the takeover.
Hong Kong Telephone Company, Limited was a powerful instrument,
especially valuable in China, where Cable Wireless was
participating in joint ventures that operate the telephone system in
Shenzhen, the special economic zone directly across the border from
Hongkong. The joint ventures were to provide telecommunications for
offshore oil exploration in the South China Sea.
In 1983, Hong Kong Telephone bought a 49% share in the Shenda
Telephone Company, which held the telephone franchise in Shenzhen.
Mr. Pemberton said as China became more and more important, the
control aspect of pledging resources to the joint venture was
necessary.
With the development mentioned above, Hong Kong Telephone
Company, Limited was expected to expand into new domains in the
future. Besides continuing to run its profitable operation in the
colony, Hong Kong Telephone, working hand in hand with Cable
Wireless, will help develop telecommunications in China. At least,
the couple will surely participate in operating the telephone system
in the special economic zones. The development in these new areas
promises, in return, to bring back long-term investment
opportunities in the PRC.
The takeover by Cable Wireless wil certainly provide Hong
Kong Telephone a much stronger financial backup. And it will be
undoubtedly helpful to secure more fa•/ourable supply of long-term
loans if the top management of Hong K,,ng Telephone is willing to
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increase its financial leverage.
ii) China Light Power Company, Limited
Similar to Hong Kong Telephone, China Light Power Company,
Limited will also participate in development projects with China.
At the end of 1983. British and Chinese officials had approved a US$
4.6 billion nuclear power plant in Guangdong province near Hong
Kong.
An agreement was signed by British and Chinese officials in
Peking to form a joint venture company to build and operate the
plant. The joint venture company would be called Guangdong Nuclear
Power Joint Venture Company. It would be 75% owned by China and 25%
owned by China Light Power Company and unnamed partners. The
agreement would allow cheap and safe electricity generated by the
plant to be sold to Hong Kong. It also covered investment and
financing.
The site of the nuclear-power plant is to be in Daya Bay of the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. The joint venture formally would be
established between the Guangdong Nuclear Investment Company and the
Bong Kong Nuclear Investment Company, which was the vehicle formed
by Hong Kong concerns for participation in the nuclear project.
China Light had mentioned that the joint venture company would
borrow 90% of the funds it needed, through government guaranteed
export credits and commercial bank loans. The shareholders would
come up with the remaining US$ 461 million, with China contributing
75%, and Hong Kong Nuclear Investment Company the remaining US$ 115
91
million.
China Light, which supplies power to the colony's Kowloon
Peninsula and the New Territories, will buy 75% of the power
generated by the plant. This project may switch China Light's role
from power supplier to power retailer. And it would let the Company
slow its local capital expenditures for the years in future. On the
other hand, the huge investment in the nuclear plant will make
long-term financing become the major issue to be solved by the
corporate top management. They will certainly take care of many
aspects, e.g. liquidity of assets, which they were not concerned
with before. Nevertheless, the investment in the nuclear-power plant








1. Your Company uses Export Credits to finance the purchase of
fixed assets abroad. What are the countries and financial
institutions involved? How would you evaluate the advantages
and disadvantages of this financing instrument?
2. From the annual reports, say in 1982, the export credit
facilities provided up to HK $340 million but the balance
of deferred creditors was only HK $78 million. Moreover,
the annual purchase of fixed assets is at hundreds of million
dollars. Why does the Company not make more extensive use of
the export credit finance?
3. Your Company had a Swiss Francs loan about HK $150 million in
1973 and it was repaid in 1978. Would you tell us more about
the nature and terms of this loan? Was it a syndicated loan?
4. In 1980, there was a bank loan of HK $75 million (it was not a
short-term loan because it was included as a deferred liability)
but it was repaid in 1981. It seems that the loan was repaid
before due, was there any special reason for this action?
S. It was noted that the current ratio is always quite low. Does
your Company concern about the situation? Also, is there any
preference in choosing between short-term vs long-term debts?
6. Does your Company rely mainly on the use of internally
generated funds and not prefer to use debt financing as far as
possible?
B. Equity
1. What factors would be considered in the timing of Rights Issues
(e.g. P/E ratios, market conditions)? What is the usual
procedure of arrangement of a Rights Issue?
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2. What are the purpose of Bonus Issues?
3. How would you evaluate the merits of issusing warrants?
4. Your Company consecutively issued common stocks in 1976 and 1977.
Was there any special reason for such short time interval?




QUESTIONNAIRE ON LONG-TERM FINANCING PRACTICE OF
CHINA LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY LIMITED
I. Questions concerning Annual Reports
A. Debt
1. Your company uses Export Credits to finance the purchase of fixed
assets from U.K.. May you tell us more about this kind of
financing?
What would other parties involve as say, guarantee or lender etc.?
What are the usual repayment periods and the interest rates of
this kind of loans?
How would your company evaluate the advantages or disadvantage of






Other terms (Please specify)
2. Your company has been arranging some loan facilities for
financing. But the facilities are usually underutilized. For
instance, in 1980 the annual report showed that there were loan
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facilities of HK$1,055.6 million, but the deferred liabilities of
loan and deferred creditors are only of about HK$320 million. What
are the reasons for this underutilization?
3. What are the ideas of your company on the separate usages of
short-term loans e.g. bank overdraft and long-term loans? (For
example, usually short-term loan may be used for financing some
kinds of purposes and long-term loan for others.)
4. The current ratios of your company for most years from 1971 to
1982 are in the range of 0.3 and 0.6. Has the company been
deliberately maintaining such range of current ratios?
However in 1978 and 1979, the current ratios were above 1.0. What
are the reasons for this change?
5. The Long-term Debt/Equity ratios of your company (obtained from
annual reports) for the years before 1979 were around 0.03. Was
it the policy of your company to maintain the ratio at such level?
However after 1979, there has been a tremendous increase in the
Long-term Debt/Equity ratio. In 1981, the ratio was 0.254. What
are the reasons for such great increase? Was the policy changed to
employing greater financial leverage?
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A. Equity
1. What factors would be considered in the timing of Rights Issues?
e.g. P/E ratios, market conditions, etc.
2. What is the purpose of Bonus Issues?
3. Your company has been continually increasing the amount of share
capital. What are the reasons for that? Is it mainly for fund
raising or just a matter of policy?
4. On issuing new shares, is management concerned about the loss of
control of ownership or of other kinds of control?
5. How does your company choose among different kinds of external
financing method, e.g. issuing shares, long-term loans and etc.?
6. The dividend payout ratios of your company for most of the years
between 1971 and 1982 are below 0.50. Does this imply that your
company is depending as much as possible on using internally
generated funds for financing?
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APPENDIX III
QUESTIONNAIRE ON FINANCING POLICY AND DECISION MAKING
1. Given an investment project, what factors would your company





. Market price of common stock
. Sales growth and availability
. Asset structure
. Lender attitude
2. What quantitative analysis would be used to aid the decision-
making process? e.g. use a range of cash flow projections and
calculate the e.p.s for various plans.
3. How does your company measure the degree of financial leverage?
(please rank)
Debt ratio
Long-term debt to total capitalization
Common equity ratio
Long-term debt to equity ratio
times-interest coverage ratio
Cash flow coverage ratio
4. Does your company have a target financial structure?
If yes, who is most important (influential) in establishing the
target?







5. How does your company calculate the cost of capital? (please tick
the appropriate)
Cost of specific source of financing
Weighted average cost of capital based on book value weights
Weighted average based on target capital structure weights
Weighted average based on current market value weights
Others (Please specify)
6. How would your company define Corporate Debt Capacity? (please
tick the appropriate)
Financial ratios
Subjective evalucation by senior management
Depends upon the conditions at the time and the projected
earnings to service the debt and interest
Maintain credit ratings
Others (Please specify)
7. Which officers and parties are usually involved in the decision
making process?
8. Do you believe that there is a relationship of financing policy to
the firm's ultimate valuation by the market?
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HSBC'S QUOTED BEST LENDING RATES
OF LOCAL BANKS BETWEEN 1971 AND 1982
The following table shows the Best Lending Rates at month ends.
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
14. 5 17.0 16.06.5 5.5 4.75 9.58.0 7.0 7.0 9.75 9.0JAN
9.5 14.5 17.0 16.09.0 6.5 5.5 4.758.0 7.0 7.0 9.75FEB
16.0 17.0 16.06.5 5.5 4.75 11.08.0 7.0 7. 5 9.75 7.5MAR
16.0 17.0 16.06.5 4.75 4.75 11.58.0 7.0 7.5 9.75 6.5APR
16.0 17.0 16.06.5 4.75 5.5 11.58.0 7. 0 7.5 9.75 6.5MAY
4.75 5.5 13.0 13.0 17.0 15.07.5 7.0 7. 5 9.75 6.5 6.5JUN
4.75 6.0 13.0 12.0 17.0 15.07.5 7.0 8.0 9.75 6.5 6.5JUL
4.75 6.0 13.0 10.0 18.0 14.07.5 7.0 8.5 12.0 6.5 6.0AUG
4.75 6.0 14.5 10. 5 18.0 12.07.5 7.0 9.0 12.0 6.5 6.0SEP
7.25 14.5 12.0 20.0 12.07.0 7.0 9.75 12.0 6.5 6.0 4.75OCT
4.75 8.75 14.5 14.0 18.0 12.07.0 7.0 9.75 11.5 6.5 6.0NOV
14.5 17.0 16.0 11.07.0 7.0 9.75 10.5 6.5 6.0 4.75 8.75DEC
Note: Before May of 1978, the lending rate was known as the Agreed
Best Lending Rate.
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, published by the
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong.
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APPENDIX VI
BANK LENDING RATES IN U.K. BETWEEN 1975 and 1982
The following table shows the Bank Lending Rates at Quarter ends.
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
7.5 14.0 18.0 13.75 14.2511.5 10.5 10.5lst Quarter
13.759.5 11.0 15.0 18.0 13.010.5 11.52nd Quarter
8.0 11.0 15. 0 17.0 14.0 11.511.0 13.03rd Quarter
7.75 13.5 18. 0 15.0 15. 5 11.012.0 15.04th Quarter
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兩 所 公 共 事 業 公 司 的 長 遠 資 金 等 集 政 策 與 作 風
對 一 所 公 司 來 說 ， 提 高 銷 量 的 其 中 一 個 條 件 是 增 加 資
產 ， 而 所 需 要 的 資 金 必 定 是 來 自 股 本 或 借 貸 ， 所 以 當
它 計 劃 增 長 時 ， 它 一 方 面 要 確 定 有 足 夠 的 資 金 ， 另 一
方 面 要 盡 量 降 低 資 金 成 本 ， 正 因 為 如 此 ， 要 作 一 個 長
期 資 金 等 集 的 決 定 是 非 常 複 雜 的 ， 但 它 對 公 司 前 景 卻
至 為 重 要 ， 尤 其 對 於 本 地 兩 所 每 年 都 有 數 億 元 資 本 性
開 支 的 公 共 事 業 公 司 ─ 香 港 電 話 、 中 華 電 力 ─ 更 為 重
要 。
作 者 曾 詳 細 分 析 該 兩 所 公 司 的 年 報 ， 並 且 深 入 訪 問 負
責 財 務 的 人 員 ， 以 便 知 道 他 們 在 長 期 資 金 等 集 上 的
政 策 和 方 法 。 明 顯 地 營 業 溢 利 是 資 金 的 主 要 來 源 ，
而 在 購 買 外 國 機 器 時 能 給 予 優 厚 的 出 口 信 貸 又 常 成
為 資 金 的 主 要 外 在 來 源 。
香 港 電 話 公 司 在 一 九 七 三 及 一 九 七 四 年 曾 發 生 資 金
週 轉 的 困 難 ， 困 難 的 部 份 成 因 是 管 理 人 員 忽 略 對 長
期 資 金 等 集 作 深 詳 計 劃 。 自 管 制 法 則 在 一 九 七 六 年
成 立 後 ， 該 公 司 的 收 入 與 溢 利 都 急 速 增 長 ， 雖 然 有
此 良 好 表 現 ， 但 可 惜 地 公 司 內 部 卻 沒 有 一 個 目 標 性
的 資 金 結 構 。
中 華 電 力 公 司 自 一 九 七 九 年 以 後 顯 著 地 增 加 長 期 借
款 ， 但 它 的 負 債 能 力 卻 受 限 制 ， 而 此 限 制 又 以 負 債
與 股 東 的 比 率 為 依 歸 ， 現 時 中 電 不 包 括 其 聯 營 公 司
在 內 的 負 債 並 不 算 高 。
香 港 電 話 公 司 的 負 債 在 比 例 上 大 大 低 於 中 電 ， 故 此
， 作 者 提 議 這 兩 所 公 司 多 用 較 為 廉 價 的 出 口 信 貸 作
為 資 金 來 源 ， 而 管 理 階 層 亦 宜 發 展 一 些 有 效 的 決 定
法 則 ， 以 便 撰 擇 等 集 長 期 資 金 的 最 佳 方 法 ， 達 到 盡
量 降 低 成 本 的 目 標 。


